Deceit and the Classification of Crimes: Federal Rule of Evidence 609 (A)(2) and the Origins of Crimen Falsi by Green, Stuart P.
Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology
Volume 90
Issue 4 Summer Article 1
Summer 2000
Deceit and the Classification of Crimes: Federal
Rule of Evidence 609 (A)(2) and the Origins of
Crimen Falsi
Stuart P. Green
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.law.northwestern.edu/jclc
Part of the Criminal Law Commons, Criminology Commons, and the Criminology and Criminal
Justice Commons
This Criminal Law is brought to you for free and open access by Northwestern University School of Law Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology by an authorized editor of Northwestern University School of Law Scholarly Commons.
Recommended Citation
Stuart P. Green, Deceit and the Classification of Crimes: Federal Rule of Evidence 609 (A)(2) and the Origins of Crimen Falsi, 90 J.
Crim. L. & Criminology 1087 (1999-2000)
00914169/00/9004-1087
THE JOURNAL OF CRIMINAL LAW & CRIMINOLoGY Vol. 90, No. 4




FEDERAL RULE OF EVIDENCE 609(A) (2)
AND THE ORIGINS OF CRIMENFALSI
STUART P. GREEN*
Few conceptual schemes in criminal law are as widely ac-
cepted, or as deeply ingrained, as the classification of offenses
according to the nature and degree of their harmfulness.
Whenever criminal conduct is to be classified, it is necessary to
ask who, or what interest, is harmed or sought to be protected.'
Indeed, if one looks at criminal codes around the world, one is
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1988, Yale Law School. I am grateful to Peter Alidridge, Ron Allen, Jim Bowers, Dick
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1 See, e.g., GEORGE E. Dix & M. MICHAEL SHARLoT, CRIMINAL LAW: CASES AND
MATERIALS 2 (4th ed. 1996) ("Crimes are generally grouped according to the interest
protected: security of the person, security of the habitation, security of rights in prop-
erty, public health, safety, and morals, and public authority"); RONALD N. BOYCE &
ROLuN M. PERKINs, CRIMiNAL LAw AND PROCEDURE 10 (7th ed. 1989) ("For a consid-
eration of the specific offenses ... it is common to have categories dependent upon
the particular type of social harm involved, such as (1) offenses against the person,
(2) offenses against property, (3) offenses against habitation and occupancy, and so
forth").
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struck-despite the great variation in, say, the elements of of-
fenses 2-by the nearly universal use of harm- or interest-based
classificatory terms such as "crimes against the person," "crimes
against the state," "crimes against property," "crimes against
public order," and "crimes against public morality."0 Even in
federal criminal law, which has yet to be organized into an inte-
grated code, offenses are categorized according to the kinds of
interests protected-whether it is protecting legitimate busi-
nesses from infiltration by organized crime (as in RICO), 4 or
protecting native American Indian communities from the
commission of a wide range of specific offenses (as in the In-
dian Crimes Act of 1976).s
2 See GEORGE FLETCHER, BASIC CONCEPTS OF CRIMINAL LAW 3-4 (1998).
3 All twenty-five of the foreign codes surveyed made use of these or closely analo-
gous offense classifications. See THE AUSIRIAN PENAL Acr (Norbert D. West & Samuel
I. Shuman trans., 1966); CANADA CRIMINAL CODE (2000)
<http://canada.justice.gc.ca/STABLE/EN/Laws/Chap/C/C-46.html>; THE CRIMINAL
CODE OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA (Chin Kim trans., 1982); THE COLOMBIAN
PENAL CODE (Phanor Eder trans., 1967); THE DANISH CRIMINAL CODE (Martin Spencer
& Gitte Hoyer trans., 1987); THE DUTCH PENAL CODE (Louise Rayor & Stafford Wad-
sworth trans. 1997); ThE PENAL CODE OF FINLAND (MattiJoutsen trans., 1987); CODE
PkNAL (FRANCE) (1999); PENAL CODE OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY (Joseph J.
Darby trans., 1987); GHANA CRIMINAL CODE (1961); THE GREEKPENAL CODE (Nicholas
B. Lolis trans., 1973); THE GREENLAND CRIMINAL CODE (Gerhard O.W. Mueller ed.,
1970); THE PENAL LAW OF INDIA (Hari Singh Gour ed., 1990); ISRAEL PENAL LAW
(Aryeh Greenfield trans., 1996); THE ITALIAN PENAL CODE (Edward M. Wise trans.,
1978); A PREPARATORY DRAFr FOR THE REVISED PENAL CODE OF JAPAN (B.J. George, Jr.
ed., 1961); THE KOREAN CRIMINAL CODE (Paul Ryu trans., 1960); LEBANON PENAL CODE
(Gabriel M. Bustros trans., 1981); THE NORWEGIAN PENAL CODE (Harald Schjoldager
trans., 1961); POLISH PENAL CODE (William S. Kenney & Tadeusz Sadowski trans.,
1973); PENAL CODE OF THE ROMANIAN SOCIALIST REPUBLIC (Simone-Marie Vrbiescu
Kleckner trans., 1976); A DRArr CRIMINAL CODE FOR SOUTH AFRICA (1995); SWEDISH
PENAL CODE (Norman Bishop trans., 1999)
<http://wings.buffalo.edu/law/bclc/sweden.pdf>; THE TURISH CRIMINAL CODE
(Nevzat Gfirelli trans., 1965); NEW SOUTH WALES (AUSTRALIA) CRIMES Acr (2000)
<http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/legis/sw/consoLact/cal9
0 082 /index.html>. See also
Part II of THE MODEL PENAL CODE (classifying crimes as Offenses Involving Danger to
the Person, Offense Against Property, Offenses Against the Family, Offenses Against
Public Administration, or Offenses Against Public Order and Decency).
4 See Racketeering Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act ("RICO"), 18 U.S.C.
§ 1961(1) (A) (1999) (prohibiting a vast range of disparate conduct-including mur-
der, kidnapping, gambling, arson, robbery, bribery, extortion, obscenity, and drug
offenses-all of which are potentially connected to the infiltration of legitimate busi-
ness by organized crime).
5 See 18 U.S.C. §§ 1151-69 (1999) (prohibiting, inter alia, the dispensing of intoxi-
cants on Indian reservations, counterfeiting and misrepresenting Indian produced
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Such emphasis on harmfulness as a classificatory principle is
understandable. Harmfulness is viewed as the "linchpin" of the
criminal law, the moral element that justifies punishment and
practically defines criminality.6 At least since John Stuart Mill,
harmfulness has been viewed as the sine qua non of criminaliza-
tion.7 Asking what harms are caused or interests affected is thus
a natural place to begin the task of classifying.8
Despite its prominence, however, harmfulness has never
been the sole principle around which crimes have been classi-
fied. Common law classifications such as felony, misdemeanor,
and major and petty offense, for example, all depend on the
idea of seriousness-a concept that is broader than (though it
obviously includes) harmfulness.9 Other classifications, such as
malum in se and malum prohibitum,1° and infamous and noninfa-
mous, n also rely less on a concept of harmfulness than on the
goods, trafficking in Indian human remains and cultural artifacts, illegal hunting and
fishing on Indian lands, stealing from Indian tribal organizations, gambling, and fail-
ing to report instances of child abuse in Indian communities).
6 See, e.g., Joshua Dressier, New Thoughts About the Concept of Justification in the
Criminal Law: A Critique of Fletcher's Thinking and Rethinking, 32 UCLA L. Rv. 61, 79
(1984) ("The linchpin of the criminal law is harm in the form of bad results or bad
conduct."); Albin Eser, The Principle of "Harm" in the Concept of Crime: A Comparative
Analysis of the Criminally Protected Legal Interests, 4 DuQUESNE L. REv. 345 (1965-66);
Stephen J. Schulhofer, Harm and Punishment: A Critique of Emphasis on the Results of
Conduct in the Criminal Law, 122 U. PA. L. REv. 1497 (1974).
7 JOHN STUART MIL, ON I-BER Y (orig. pub. 1859). The classic contemporary
treatment of the "harm principle" is JOEL FtINBIERG, THE MORAL LIMrIs OF THE
CRiMINAL LAW (consisting of four separately published volumes, 1984, 1985, 1986, and
1988).
8 Beccaria, for example, in his chapter on "the classification of crimes," begins
with the proposition that the "true measure of crimes" is "harm to society." He then
goes on to offer a brief outline of his own system of classification. CESARE BECCARiA,
ON CIMES AND PUNISHMENTS 24-25 (Richard Davies trans., 1995) (1st ed. 1764).
9Murder and manslaughter, for example, both involve the same basic harm, yet
the former is a more serious offense. I have previously dealt with the difference be-
tween seriousness and harmfulness in Stuart P. Green, Why It's a Crime to Tear the Tag
Off a Mattress: Overcriminalization and the Moral Content of Regulaty Offenses, 46 EMORY
LJ. 1533, 1552 (1997).
10 Malum in se offenses are those that would be viewed by society as morally wrong-
ful even if they were not prohibited by law. Malum prhibitum offenses are those that
are viewed as wrong only, or primarily, because they have been proscribed by law.
For a detailed discussion of the distinction, see id. at 1569-80.
11 At common law, conviction of an infamous offense made a person incompetent
to be a witness. Such witnesses were thought to be ipso facto untrustworthy. The in-
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idea of moral wrongfulness (the degree to which an act violates
a moral norm) or culpability (whether an actor intended her
act or was mistaken or insane).12
How we classify crimes is (as I have suggested elsewhere)
important, both doctrinally,8 and as a window into the deeper
moral and social content of specific offenses. 4 Yet to consider
each of these various systems of classification (i.e., felony vs.
misdemeanor, malum in se vs. malum prohibitum, infamous vs.
noninfamous) would constitute a vast (and perhaps tedious)
undertaking. This article focuses instead on the history of one
particularly intriguing form of classification-namely, the con-
cept of crimenfalsi, the crime of falsehood or deceit.
To the modem American lawyer, crimenfalsi is familiar, if at
all, as a category of offenses recognized by Rule 609 (a) (2) of the
Federal Rules of Evidence, which allows for impeachment of a
witness who has been convicted of a crime involving "dishonesty
or false statement." The original Conference Report makes the
famous crimes consisted of treason, felony, and the crimrinafalsi, the last of which are
discussed at length below. See RoLLIN M. PERXNS & RONALD N. BOYCE, CIMINAL LAW
27 (3d ed. 1982); see also WAYNE R. LAFAVE & AuSTIN W. ScoTr, JR., CRIMNAL LAw 29-
37 (2d ed. 1986) (discussing different categories by which offenses are classified);
CHsALESE. TORCIA, WHARTON'S CM~NAL LAW §§ 17-22 (15th ed. 1993).
12 1 have previously dealt with the differences among harmfulness, moral wrong-
fulness, and culpability in Green, supra note 9, at 1547-53.
13 Whether a crime is classified as an offense "against the person" or an offense
"against property," for example, can determine matters such as whether a police offi-
cer is authorized to shoot a fleeing felon, whether a defendant can be extradited,
which evidentiary standard a prosecutor should follow in deciding whether to charge
a suspect, and whether an attorney has an ethical obligation to disclose a confidence
regarding the possible future commission of a crime. Stuart P. Green, Prototype The-
oy and the Classification of Offenses in a Revised Model Penal Code: A General Approach to
the Special Part, 4 Burr. CRIM. L. REv. (forthcoming, 2000).
14 For example, the fact that rape is now generally classified as a crime against the
person rather than as a morals offense (as was once common) is indicative of the evo-
lution in society's views of that crime. Similarly, the classification of robbery as a
crime against property rather than a crime against the person tells us something sig-
nificant (and perhaps surprising) about how our criminal justice system views the act
of theft by force or violence. Id. For further discussion of the significance of classifi-
cation, see RonaldJ. Allen, The Explanatoty Value of Analyzing Codifications by Reference to
Organizing Principles Other Than Those Employed in the Codijfication, 79 Nw. U.L.REv. 1080
(1984-85), and sources cited in Green, supra note 13, at note 30.
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link between Rule 609 (a) (2) and the ciminafalsi explicit, defin-
ing the phrase "crimes involving dishonesty or false statement"
as "crimes such as perjury, subornation of perjury, false state-
ments, criminal fraud, embezzlement, or false pretense, or any
other offense in the nature of crimen falsi, the commission of
which involves some element of deceit, untruthfulness, or falsi-
fication bearing on the accused's propensity to testify truth-
fully. ' 15 Yet the idea of ca/men falsi did not originate with the
Federal Rules, nor indeed with the law of evidence. Long be-
fore cimenfalsi comprised an evidentiary concept, it functioned
as a classification in substantive criminal law.
Part I of this article considers several preliminary matters
concerning the definition of deceit, the role of deceit in both
unifying and distinguishing various criminal offenses, and the
relationship between deceit and social harmfulness. Part II sur-
veys the history of cimenfalsi from its origins in the Roman law
of the first century B.C.E. to its refinement in the Spanish law of
the 1200s. Part III describes the transformation of cimen falsi
from a substantive criminal law category to an evidentiary cate-
gory that, initially, allowed for the disqualification of witnesses,
and, later, merely their impeachment. Finally, Part IV examines
the modem law of crimen falsi, suggesting that two of the most
intractable problems in the interpretation of Federal Rule of
Evidence 609 (a) (2) are most properly addressed with an appre-
ciation of the doctrine's substantive criminal law origins.
I. PRELIMINARY ISSUES
A. WHAT IS "DECEIT"?
Before we can talk about the concept of deceit as a means
for classifying crime, it will be helpful to have a definition of the
term. As I shall use it here, deceit will refer to the communica-
tion of a message with which the communicator, in communi-
cating, intends to mislead-that is, the communication of a
15 H.R. CONF. REP. No. 93-1037, at 9 (1975).
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message intended to cause a person to believe something that is
untrue.
16
It is important to note, however, that deceitful conduct that
may satisfy the elements of one criminal statute may not satisfy
the elements of another. Consider the difference between per-
jury and mail fraud. As explained by the Supreme Court in
Bronston v. United States, a non-responsive statement that is liter-
ally true is not perjurious, no matter how misleading. 7 (One
need only think of President Clinton's supposedly "legalistic"
defense to charges that he committed perjury during his deposi-
tion in the PaulaJones case.) Yet, as demonstrated by the Ninth
Circuit's widely cited opinion in Lustiger v. United States, a simi-
larly true but misleading statement can constitute a "scheme to
defraud" under the mail fraud statute.' 8 The point is simply
that deceit in the criminal law, as elsewhere, is an elastic and
frequently variable concept.
B. DECEIT AS A UNIFYING, AND DISTINGUISHING, FACTOR
Even if there were a fixed and certain concept of deceit that
applied to all crimes, there would remain questions about which
offenses should be classified as crimes of deceit. As we shall see
when we consider Federal Rule of Evidence 609 (a) (2), courts
have struggled to determine whether offenses such as embez-
zlement, larceny, blackmail, and extortion should qualify as
crimes "involving dishonesty or false statement.' ' 9
For now, it is enough to note that any grouping of "crimes
of deceit" will comprise a range of offenses involving quite dif-
ferent forms of harmfulness. Perjury and false statements, for
example, involve injury to the administration of government.
Forgery and false pretenses, by contrast, typically involve harms
16 The dictionary defines "deceive" as "caus[ing] to believe what is not true; mis-
lead." AMEmiCAN HERITAGE COLLEGE DICTIONARY (3d ed. 1997). For further discus-
sion of the definition of deceit, see sources cited infra note 20.
17 409 U.S. 352, 358 (1973).
18 386 F.2d 132, 138 (9th Cir. 1967) (interpreting 18 U.S.C. § 1341), cert. denied,
390 U.S. 951 (1968). The moral and doctrinal differences between perjury and fraud
are discussed further in my work-in-progress, "Lying, Deceiving, and Falsely Denying
Some Moral and Legal Lessons of the Clinton Sex-Perjury Scandal and the Demise of
the 'Exculpatory No' Doctrine."
See infra notes 115-31 and accompanying text.
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to business relations. The only plausible basis for grouping to-
gether such otherwise disparate offenses is that all involve a
common form of moral wrongfulness.
The concept of deceit, moreover, can also serve as a factor
that distinguishes otherwise similar offenses. Consider the dis-
tinction among larceny, embezzlement, and false pretenses. All
three offenses involve the same basic harm-the misappropria-
tion of another's property. What distinguishes them is the mor-
ally wrongful means by which such property is taken. In
contrast to larceny (which requires stealth) and embezzlement
(which involves a breach of trust), false pretenses is distin-
guished by the requirement of deceit.
C. THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN DECEIT AND HARMFULNESS
Although harmfulness and the morally wrongful act of de-
ceit constitute distinct criteria for classifying offenses, it should
be clear that deceit and harmfulness are not wholly unrelated.
Indeed, deceit often causes harm. A society in which deceit and
dishonesty are rampant will be unstable; personal relations will
suffer, commercial transactions will be hindered, government
operations will be impeded, uncertainty and cynicism will pre-
vail.
20
The significance of harm-causing deceit is particularly evi-
dent in the law of theft. Consider again the distinction between
larceny and false pretenses. Although both involve the wrong-
ful taking of property, the harms involved in the two crimes are
distinguishable. One who has been defrauded of fifty dollars by
a confidence man is likely to feel very different from a person
who has had fifty dollars stolen by a thief. As Peter Alldridge
has noted:
[I] f a victim is going to suffer a particular harm, it is less painful for him
or her and less culpable of the person causing it that the harm should be
caused without whatever additional unpleasantness comes from the de-
ception of the victim. In the case of frauds there is far more likely to be
20For a useful discussion of these and related issues, see SISSELA BoK, LYING: MORAL
CHOICE IN PUBLIC AND PRIVATE LIFE (1978). For a survey of the academic literature on
deceit, see Stuart P. Green, Deception, in READER'S GUIDE TO THE SOCIAL ScIENcEs (Jona-
than Michie, ed.) (forthcoming, 2000).
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the loss of self-esteem consequent upon feeling responsible by reason of
having been duped.
21
Given its relationship to harmfulness, then, it is not surpris-
ing that deceit continues to play a role in various classificatory
schemes. A good example is the way in which both the Model
Penal Code22 and the English Theft Act of 1968 23 have dealt with
deceit in the law of theft. Both statutes consolidate the tradi-
tional acquisitive offenses (larceny, embezzlement, false pre-
tenses, extortion, blackmail, fraudulent conversion, and
receiving stolen property) in a manner that obviously reflects
the similarity in harms caused.24  Yet, within the broad rubric of
"theft offenses," each statute retains categories such as Theft by
Deception (in the case of the Model Penal Code25) and Obtain-
ing Property by Deception (in the case of the English Theft
Act 6). In both instances, the principal factor that distinguishes
such offenses from other theft offenses is the presence of deceit.
21Peter Alldridge, Sex, Lies and the Criminal Law, 44 N. IR AND LEGAL Q. 250, 251
(1993). Lloyd Weinreb has made a somewhat similar point:
A society in which one is not well protected even from the snatchpurse is different from a
society in which one is so protected, even if there is not effective protection against decep-
tive trade practices. Even the finer distinction between larceny by trick and false pretenses
is not self-evidently pointless; someone who expects the return of the property with which
she has parted, or who at least still believes that the property is hers, may react differently
to its loss than she would to the loss of her part of a bargain by which she gave up that par-
ticular property for good. Similarly, the community may feel different moral sentiments
about someone who initiates or engages in a transaction for the purpose of depriving an-
other.
LLOYD L. WEINREB, CRIMINAL LAW: CASES, COMMENT, QuESTIoNS 395-96 (6th ed. 1998).
22 MODEL PENAL CODE § 223.1-.2 (1985).
23 Theft Act, 1968, ch. 60, §§ 1, 7 (Eng.).
24 See, e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE, § 223.1 commentary at 131-32 ("[T]heft by a
stranger and ... theft by a fiduciary represent similar dangers requiring approxi-
mately the same treatment and characterization. . .. Prevailing moral standards do
not differentiate sharply between the swindler and other 'thieves.' To that extent, at
least, consolidation conforms to the common understanding of what is substantially
the same kind of undesirable conduct.").
25 MODEL PENAL CODE § 223.3.
26 Theft Act, 1968, ch. 60, § 15 (Eng.).
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II. ORIGINS OF CRLMENFMSI
A. THE ROMAN LEX CORNELA DEFALSIS
Centuries before crimenfalsi denominated a concept in the
law of evidence, it functioned as a category of Roman substan-
tive criminal law. The term first appeared during the late Re-
public, in the lex Cornelia de Falsis of 81 B.C.E. Although the
original text of this law has been lost, much of it has been re-
constructed through references injustinian's Digest.
28
The lex Cornelia was part of an important procedural innova-
tion introduced by the Roman dictator and law reformer, Lu-
cius Sulla. Prior to the early first century B.C.E., criminal
jurisdiction in Rome had been vested in the paterfamilias, tresviri
capitales, and various assemblies of the people, rather than in
any permanent court system.29 Morever, criminal law and civil
law were not clearly distinguished. Many acts that would be re-
garded as criminal under modem law were regarded as "de-
27 The five-century period known as the Roman Republic (510-27 B.C.E.) saw tre-
mendous growth in Rome's size and influence and political innovations such as the
abolition of the monarchy and government by a hierarchy of magistrates headed by
two consuls. The Republic ended (and the Empire began) in 27 B.C.E. when Octa-
vian (taking the name Augustus) became de facto emperor of the Roman world. For
useful general introductions to the study of Roman law, see ANDREW BoRxowsKI,
TEXTBOOK ON ROMAN LAw 3-4, 10 (1994); H.F. JoLoWIcz & BARRY NICHOLAS,
HISTORICAL INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY OF ROMAN LAW (3d ed. 1972); BARRY
NICHOLAS, AN INTRODUCTION TO ROMAN LAw (1962); O.F. ROBINSON, THE SOURCES OF
ROMAN LAW: PROBLEMS AND METHODS FOR ANCIENT HISTORIANS (1997); J.AC. THOMAS,
TExTBOOKOF ROMAN LAw (1976).
28 See Philip Grierson, The Roman Law of Counterfeiting, in ESSAYS IN ROMAN COINAGE
]PRESENTED TO HAROLD MATTINGLY 240-261, 242 (RA.G. Carson and C.H.V. Suther-
land, eds. 1956);JA Crook, Lex Cornelia deFalsis, 65 ATHENAEUM 163-71 (1987). Jus-
tinian (527-65 C.E.) was a Byzantine emperor whose most important achievement was
the codification of Roman law, the centerpiece of which was the Digest, a legal ency-
clopedia containing a compilation and summary ofjuristic literature by the leading
academics, practitioners, and government ministers of the day. BORKOwSKI, supra
note 27, at 50-5 1. See also Charles Donahue, Jr., Book Review: On Translating the Digest,
39 STAN. L. REV. 1057 (1987).
29 O.F. ROBINSON, THE CRIMINAL LAW OFANCIENTROME 1 (1995). The tresviri capi-
tales were minor magistrates with police functions. One exception was the Lex Cal-
purnia of 149 B.C.E., which established a permanent court of senators, who acted as
sworn jurors, to deal with claims of provincial extortion. Id.
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licts"-civil wrongs for which quasi-penal sanctions could be
imposed.30
A breakdown in social norms among the Roman aristocracy
in the late Republic created a need for a more standardized sys-
tem of criminal justice. Sulla responded by enacting a series of
statutes establishing quaestiones perpetuae, or specialized perma-
nent jury courts, each of which was empowered to hear cases in-
volving one or more specific crimes (known as publica judicia),
such as murder, treason, and extortion!' (In this sense, Roman
criminal law was more like the loose collection of statutes that
now comprise federal criminal law than like an integrated
code.)
One of these statutes was the lex Cornelia de Falsis, which cre-
ated a permanent court known as the questio defalsis. At its in-
ception, the questio de falsis was concerned exclusively with the
forgery of wills and counterfeiting of coinage. 2 The standard
penalty for committing a crime of falsum was deportation and
confiscation; only slaves could be sentenced to death . The
power to bring an accusation under the lex Cornelia was held by
all free men and by free women whose interests were at stake.34
Over time, the jurisdiction of the questio de falsis and the
scope of the lex Cornelia de Falsis grew dramatically. Through
resolutions of the Senate and influential juristic commentary,
the category of crimenfalsi was broadened to include numerous
offenses not contained in the original statute.35 One scholar has
30 BORKOWSEI, supra note 27, at 302-35.
31 ROBINSON, supra note 29, at 3. The Publica Judicia are described in 1 JAMES
FrrzJAMEs STEPHEN, A HISTORY OF THE CRIMINAL LAW OF ENGLAND 13 (1883).
32 As Olivia Robinson has noted, there is a debate among scholars as to whether
what Sulla established was one court having jurisdiction over two separate offenses
(forgery of wills and counterfeiting) or whether instead forgery and counterfeiting
were seen as two aspects of a single crime. According to Robinson, the weight of
scholarly opinion favors the latter understanding. Olivia F. Robinson, An Aspect ofFal-
sum, 60 TIJDSCHRIFT VOOR REHTSGESCHIEDENIS 29, 29 (1992); ROBINSON, supra note
29, at 36.
33 DIG. 48.10.1.13 (Marcian, Institutes 14), translated in 4 THE DIGEST OFJUSTINIAN
8242 (Theodor Mommsen & Paul Krueger eds., Alan Watson trans., U. Pa. Press
1985).
34 ROBINSON, supra note 29, at 36.
35 Some of this early history is described in STEPHEN, supra note 31, at 20-22.
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described the legal environment that made such expansion pos-
sible:
[Development of the lex Cornelia de Falsis] came partly through the
replies of the emperor or his ministers to requests for decisions in
particular cases and partly through the opinions of the great jurists as
embodied in such manuals of the law and handbooks for provincial
governors as Gaius' Libri ad edictum provincale, Paul's Sententiae, and
Ulpian's Libri de offwio proconsulis. The law was never a precise collec-
tion of rules and sanctions, with penalties incurred automatically by
those found guilty of offences. It was a system of direction for the
guidance of those charged with administering the law, who were al-
lowed considerable latitude in their decisions and were free to elabo-
rate the punishments when there were aggravating circumstances and
mitigate them when there were extenuating circumstances.3
6
The early part of the first century C.E. witnessed several sig-
nificant expansions in the lex Cornelia de Falsis. Augustus, who
had been Emperor since 31 B.C.E., had begun to allow the Sen-
ate a significant role as a lawmaking body through means of
Senate resolutions or directives known as senatusconsulta
("SC').37 One of these, SC Libonianum of 16 C.E., expanded the
definition of Jalsum to include the writing of oneself into the
text of a will,' as well as possibly the forgery of documents other
than wills.3 1 A second, and even more significant, expansion of
the lex Cornelia occurred a few years later. SC Messalianum of 20
C.E.40 and SC Geminianum of 29 G.E.4 ' extended the falsum to in-
36 Grierson, supra note 28, at 243 (citing THEODOR MOMMSEN, R6MIsN Es
STRAFREcHT 1037-44 (1899)).
37 BoRKowsia, supra note 27, at 35-36.
38 CODEJUST. 9.23.1, translated in 15 THE CIVM LAW (S.P. Scott trans., 1932); see
Bernardo Albanese, Sul Senatconsulto Liboniano, 36 ANNAU DEL SEMINA~iO GIuRIDIcO
DELIAUNvERSITADI PALERMO 289 (1976).
3 9 The development of the lex Cornelia and other Roman criminal law during this
period (known as the Principate) is described in Alvaro D'Ors, Contribuciones a la His-
toria del "Crimen Falsi, -2 STUDI IN ONORE DI EDOARDO VOLTERA 527 (1971); Giovanni
Pugliese, Linee Generali dell'evoluzione del Diritto Penale Pubblico Durante il Principato, 2
AUFSTEIG UND NIEDERGANG DER R6MISCHEN WELT 722 (1982); Fabio Marino, I Falso
Testamentario nel Diritto Romano, ZErrSCHRIFF DER SAVIGNY-STIFTUNG FOR
REcHTSGEScHIcHTE 634 (1988).
40 MosAIcARuM ET ROMANARUM LEGUM COLATo 8.7.2 (Ulpian, Proconsulis 8) 101
(M. Hyamson trans., 1913).
41 Id. 8.7.3., at 101.
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clude a wide range of trial-related offenses, such as perjury and
false testimony (whether oral or written), subornation of per-
jury, withholding of evidence, bribery and extortion of judges
and jurors, and the making of false accusations. 2
Probably the greatest expansion in the concept of crimen
falsi occurred during the reign of the Emperor Hadrian (117-38
C.E.). It was during this period that the criminal sanctions of
the lex Cornelia were first applied to deceitful conduct involving
commercial transactions. Under Hadrian, the notion offalsum
was understood to include both the use of false weights and
measures44 and the selling of the same thing fraudulently to two
people.45 The lex Cornelia may even have been interpreted to
apply to what amounts to the modem offense of false claims.
So expansive was the interpretation of crimen falsi that, by the
third century, C.E., it was difficult to distinguish between
fraudulent business conduct that was subject to the jurisdiction
of the questio defalsis and that which was to be dealt with under a
vague, quasi-criminal residual category known as stellionatus, or
swindling. One can only speculate as to why the concept of
42 ROBINSON, supra note 29, at 37; D'Ors, supra note 39, at 553-57; Pugliese, supra
note 39, at 756-60. So significant was this expansion in jurisdiction that, by the time
of the Emperor Nero's reign in the middle of the first century G.E., the caseload as-
sociated with the lex Cornelia was weighty enough to have ruined the health of Rutilius
Gallicus, the judicial officer assigned to deal with cases involving the crimen falsi.
RIcHARD A. BAUMAN, CRIME AND PUNISHMENT IN ANciENT ROME 103 (1996).
43BAUMAN, supra note 42, at 158; ROBINSON, supra note 29, at 37.
44DIG. 48.10.32.1 (Modestinus, Punishments 1), DIGEST OFJUSTINIAN, supra note
33, at 829a ("If a seller or a buyer tampers with the publicly approved measures of
wine, corn, or any other thing, or commits a deception with malicious intent, he is
sentenced to a fine of double the value of the thing concerned; and it was laid down
by decree of the deified Hadrian that those who had falsified weights or measures
should be relegated to an island."); id., 7.11.6 (Ulpian 8 de off. proconsulis).
45 BAUMAN, supra note 42, at 158; DIGEST 48.10.21 (Paul, ad Senatus Consultum
Turpillianum) ("Anyone who sells the same thing as a complete whole by separate
contracts to two persons is punished by the penalty for forgery, as was laid down by
the deified Hadrian").
46 In the words of Marcellus, "[if any tutor or curator] contrary to this law cheats
the prefects or the state treasury he is punished in exactly the same manner as if he
had committed forgery." DIG. 48.10.1.9 (Marcian, Institutes 14) in DIGEST OF
JUSTINIAN, supra note 33, at 823a.
47 See D'Ors, supra note 39, at 557; ROBINSON, supra note 29, at 39. The stellionatus
is described by Robinson as:
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crimenfalsi grew to encompass such a seemingly disparate collec-
tion of offenses. The Roman jurists themselves, as was their
practice, offer no theoretical account of why such offenses
should be linked together. The closest we come is a somewhat
vague statement from the commentator Paul, who characterized
crimen falsi as applying to "that which in reality does not exist,
but is asserted as true. 48
Any plausible explanation for such expansion must recog-
nize the procedural context in which the criminafalsi developed.
Despite its Latinate origins, the Roman principle of nullum cti-
men sine lege ("no crime without law") was considerably weaker
than the modem principle of legality. 9 The complex relation-
ship among the Emperor, the Senate, and the commentators al-
lowed for specialized courts such as the questio de falsis to
respond to the particular needs of the day by analogizing to ex-
isting legislation, effectively creating new offenses. Assigningju-
risdiction over specific crimes to specialized courts, moreover,
undoubtedly led to a kind of 'jurisdiction creep." When social
problems involving deceit in court proceedings or commercial
transactions arose, it was natural to look for a solution to the
questio defalsis, which had already been dealing with (what must
have been seen as) analogous issues in the context of forgery
and counterfeiting. The result, by the third century C.E., was a
collection of criminafalsi far broader than Sulla could ever have
envisioned.
clearly a vague crime, a catch-all for the dishonest, comparable with the delict of dolus; Paul
described stellionatus as a means of persuading someone to hand his property to another.
It was as this kind of safety-net against criminals that we find it received into both Scots and
French law. Just as the actio de dolo was a residuary in private law, so in the criminal field
stellionatus could be charged wherever there was fraudulent dealing which, nevertheless,
did not fall within any other crime, such as forgery or theft. Examples given are pledging
the same thing twice, or pledging another's property as though one's own, or imposture,
or withholding wages; also classed under stellionatis was a case of perjury, where someone
swore in a document that something was his own when in fact it was only pledged.
Id. at 32 (footnotes omitted). For further discussion of the stellionatus, see infra note
62.
48 Paul. Coll. 8, 6, 1 (quoted in ADOLF BERGER, ENCYCLOPEDIC DICIONARY OF
ROMAN LAW (1953)). See also S.P. SCoTt, THE CIVIL LAW, at 47 n.1 (1973 ed.) (describ-
ing crimen falsi as embracing "nearly every species of deceit by whose agency anyone
might be prejudiced, or deprived of his rights").
49 For a discussion of the Roman origins of this doctrine, see JEROME HALL,
PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL LAw 27-30 (2d ed. 1960). See also T.R.S. ALLAN, LAW, ILBERTy,
ANDJUSTICE: THE LEGALFOUNDATiONS OF BRITISH CONSTrIUTIONAISM 33-39 (1993).
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B. CRIMES OF DECEIT IN LAS SIETEPARTIDAS
Standing approximately midway between Roman law and
the enactment of modern civil codes on the Continent, Las Siete
Partidas (the Seven Books of Law) constitute one of the great
landmarks of Spanish law and a crucial step in the development
of European law.50 Enacted in 1262, the Partidas were compiled
by lawyers, scholars, and theologians in the court of Alfonso X,
known as "the Wise" or "Learned" because of his achievements
in science and letters.5
The purpose of the compilation was to provide a common
system of law for all of the inhabitants of Alfonso's realm. 2
There is some question as to whether Las Siete Partidas were ever
intended to be a code of enforceable law, or whether instead
they were to function as a kind of legal encyclopedia, a guide to
future legislation-rather like the Restatements or Model Penal
Code of their day.5 3 Indeed, one of the most interesting aspects
of Las Siete Partidas is the inclusion, within each Partida, of ex-
tensive commentaries containing moral advice and practical
philosophy. 4
Although the Partidas themselves contain little explicit indi-
cation of their sources, the influence of Roman law (as well as
canon law) is evident throughout 5 Many provisions are drawn
almost verbatim from Justinian's Digest.56 Moreover, the Partidas
are structured in an obviously "civilian" manner. Reminiscent
of Roman law and later civil codes in France and elsewhere,
each of the seven books treats a different area of the law-
canon law; public law (government and administration of
50 LAs SIETE PARTIDAS (Samuel Parsons Scott trans., 1931).
51 Charles Sumner Lobingier, Introduction to LAs SIETE PARTIDAS (Samuel Parsons
Scott trans., 1931), supra note 50, at xlix.
52 Marilyn Stone, Las Siete Partidas in America: Problems of Cultural Transmission in the
Translation of Legal Signs, in TRANSLATION AND THE LAw (Marshall Morris ed., 1995).
53 See Lobingier, supra note 51, at lii.
54 As described by one historian, the Partidas provided a "complete body of moral-
ity and religion, defining the duties of every citizen, from the highest to the lowest
station; assigning the grounds of their duties, and deducing one obligation from an-
other with great precision and with some force of reasoning." 6 SAMUEL AST=E
DUNHAM, HIsTORY OF SPAIN AND PORTUGAL, 109, 131-32 (1832) (quoted in Lobingier,
supra note 51, at Ivii).
55 PETER STEIN, ROMAN LAWIN EUROPEAN HISTORY 65-66 (1999).
56 Lobingier, Introduction, supra note 51, at liv.
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law; public law (government and administration ofjustice); pro-
cedure and property; family law; obligations (contracts) and
maritime law; successions (inheritance and wills); and crime
and punishment.
57
Criminal law is dealt with in the Seventh Partida. As in
modern criminal codes, the primary mode of classification is
harmfulness.58 Title VIII of the Seventh Partida, for example,
collects various homicide offenses: intentional killings, acciden-
tal killings through no fault of the defendant, accidental killings
caused by defendant's fault, abortions, infanticide, and deaths
caused by physicians or apothecaries. Similarly, Title XV con-
tains a collection of property offenses: damage to houses and
ships, property damage caused by domesticated animals, and as-
sorted criminal nuisances.
But, given both the influence of Roman law and the moral
cast of Las Siete Partidas, it is not surprising that harmfulness is
not the only criterion by which crimes are classified. Indeed,
the Seventh Partida seems as much a guide to proper conduct as
a criminal code-a quality that is apparent in its extended dis-
cussion of subjects such as what it means to cause a person's
dishonor,59 and what constitutes proper grounds for the renun-
ciation or repudiation of a friendship.60
Of particular interest is Title VII of the Seventh Partida,
which deals with Falsedad, offenses "concerning deceit." The of-
fenses mentioned include "deceit practiced by a wife when she
presents the child of another person to her husband as his
own"; forging documents or seals; "revealing the secrets of the
king"; falsely measuring lands or establishing boundaries; pos-
sessing false weights and measures; counterfeiting money; and
practicing alchemy (which consists of "deceiving men and mak-
ing them believe what cannot be according to nature") .6' Also
included are the fraudulent alteration, concealment, and de-
57I.As StTE PARTimAS, supra note 50.
58 The Seventh Partida also contains procedural provisions involving matters such
as double jeopardy, who may be charged with a criminal offense and who may bring
such charges, jurisdictional matters, and termination and settlement of criminal pro-
ceedings. LAS SiETE PARTIDAS, supra note 50, at 1303-1484
59 Id., at 1351-62.
60 Id. at 1371.
61 Id. at 1338-41.
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struction of documents; giving false testimony; subornation of
perjury; and bribery of, and solicitation by, witnesses and
judges.
There are several aspects of Las Siete Partidas' treatment of
crimes of deception that need to be noted. First is the remark-
able specificity of such offenses, which are considerably more
detailed than in the lex Cornelia de Falsis. Second is the
comprehensiveness of the apparatus surrounding these of-
fenses, including rules about who can be a defendant and who
may bring an accusation, as well as penalties upon conviction
(ranging from burning at the stake for counterfeiting and death
for forgery, to banishment to an island for a period of years for
using false weights and measures). Third, and perhaps most
significant, is the commentary that goes with codification.
Here, for the first time are a definition of deceit ("the alteration
of the truth") and a statement of moral values that apparently
link these various offenses. Title VII of the Seventh Partida, Fal-
sedad, begins, "One of the greatest acts of wickedness which a
man can be guilty of is to deceive, for many evils and great inju-
ries result to men from this." 6e Las Siete Partidas thus makes ex-
plicit what the Roman law had only implied: that the primary
link among these various, apparently disparate offenses is the
morally wrongful act of deceit and the particular kinds of harms
with which that act is associated.
III. TRANSFORMATIONS IN THE LAW OF CRTMENFALSI
Given its Roman origins and subsequent development in
Spain, it is not surprising that the concept of crimenfalsi has en-
62 Id. at 1337. Yet, broad as Title VII of the Seventh Partida is, it should be noted
that it does not contain (what was apparently viewed as the less serious crime of)
fraud, which is codified elsewhere (in Title XVI) and defined as deception committed
with the intent to cheat. Id. at 1406-10. Examples of fraud are knowingly, selling
something as gold or silver, knowing that it is not so; or representing any good as be-
ing of a higher quality than it actually is; using false dice, tricking people into aban-
doning their property (for example, by throwing a serpent into a crowd at a public
market or fair, and frightening people into fleeing and abandoning their merchan-
dise); and convincing credulous people that one has magical powers. In this, Las
Sieta Partidas again seems to have followed the Roman law, which treated the offense
of stellionatus, or swindling, separately from the criminafa. See supra note 47 and ac-
companying text.
63 Id. at 1337.
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joyed particular prominence in civil law jurisdictions. During
the eighteenth century, for example, civil law scholars such as
Thomas Wood and Samuel Hallifax made crimen falsi a cen-
tral element in their schemes of classification. Even today,
though the category of crimen falsi has virtually disappeared
from modem criminal codes, the leading legal encyclopedias in
Spain, Italy, Mexico, and Argentina all continue to offer lengthy
discussions of the subject.66
64 Wood's book, An Institute of the Laws of England; or the Law of England in their
Natural Order, According to Common Use (1720), has been referred to as "the leading
work on English law until superseded by Blackstone's Commentaries in 1769." DANIEL
R. COQUILLETrE, THE CIVnIAN WRrERs OF DoCroRs' COMMON, LONDON 199 (1988)
(citations omitted). See also 12 WILLIAM HOLswORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW
418-20, 425-28 (1938 ed.); Alan Watson, Justinian's Institutes and Some English Counter-
parts, in JUSTINIAN's INSTUTES IN MEMORY OFJ.A.C. THOMAS 181, 185-86 (1983).
Wood's New Institute of Imperial or Civil Law (originally published in 1704), one of the
major English works on Roman law, contains an especially broad view of the crimina
falsi. See THOMAS WOOD, AN INSTIUrE OF THE IMPERIAL OR Crvii LAw § II1.10.14, at
282-83 (4th ed. 1730). Wood wrote that the criminafalsi all involved the "fraudulent
suppression or imitation of truth to the prejudice of another." Three things, he said,
were required in such crimes: "corruption of truth, deceit and damage to another."
Id. Wood then went on to list the "various shapes" of falsehood that make up the
criminafalst (1) "when one sells or mortgages the same thing to two persons in two
several contracts"; (2) "perjury, when a witness knowingly bears false witness in a
court of justice, or is guilty of suborning others"; (3) "By writing, as in forgery, or
signing of false instruments and deeds, or knowingly using instruments forged by
others; or when a notary writes that which was false, or omits that which is true, or by
concealing any writing, or blotting, cutting out what was written or opening, unseal-
ing and altering the wills or private letters of other men"; (4) "By fact, which has no
relation to writing, as when a child is fraudulently put in the place of another child;
when a false person is represented"; and (5) "False weights and measures made use
of; a false coat of arms assumed; the publick money clipped, or false money coined, &
c." Id.
65 Hallifax, another leading eighteenth century English scholar of Roman law, ex-
plained that the lex Cornelia de Falsis "was enacted to punish the fraudulent suppres-
sion or imitation of truth, to the prejudice of another." SAMUEL HALIFAX, AN
ANALysIs OF THE ROMAN CrIL LAw 134 (2d ed. 1775). Included in this class of of-
fenses, which "might be committed by words, by writing, or by deed," were perjury,
subornation of perjury, forgery, counterfeiting, false weights and measures, "selling
or mortgaging the same thing to two persons in two several contracts," and "support-
ing the law suit of another by money, witnesses, or patronage." Id.
66 See ENCICLOPEDIA JURfDICA EsPAfOLA (entry on falsedad) (Spain); 16
ENCICLOPEDIA DEL DiRrrro 504 (1967) (entry on falsita e falso) (Italy); D-H
DIccIONAmOJuRaDIcO MEXIcANO 1425 (2d ed. 1987) (entry on falsificaci6n) (Mexico);
11 ENCiCLOPEDuJuRmicA OMEBA 849 (1977) (entry on falsedad) (Argentina).
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A. CRTMENFALSIUNDER THE COMMON LAW
In comparison to the civil law tradition, the path of crimen
falsi in the common law has been an uneven and circuitous one.
The history is marked by two major shifts: first, from a (relatively
insignificant) substantive criminal law classification to category
in evidence law (described in this section); and second, from an
evidentiary category that resulted in the disqualification of wit-
nesses, to one that resulted merely in their impeachment (de-
scribed in the next section).
Although the concept of crimen falsi is mentioned by early
common law commentators such as Glanville 67 and Bracton, 6it
never played a particularly significant role in their schemes of
classification. Both commentators use the term narrowly to re-
fer almost exclusively to forgery and counterfeiting (much as it
had been used in Sulla's time).
Why did the early English commentators define crimenfalsi
so narrowly? One explanation is that the moral theory they at-
tached to crimen falsi was a narrow one. Unlike Roman law,6
early English common law viewed the central crimen falsi of-
fenses of counterfeiting and forgery as having more to do with
treason than with deceit. Since the issuance of coinage and of-
ficial documents had always been a prerogative of sovereignty,
the theory went, counterfeiting and forgery posed a threat to
such sovereignty, and were therefore analogous to treason.70
67See RANULF DE GLANvI.LE, THE TREATISE ON THE LAWS AND CUSTOMS OF THE REALM
OF ENGLAND XIV:7, at 176-77 (orig. publ. 1187-89; G.D.C. Hall trans. & ed., 1965)
(crimen falsi offenses include making false charters, false measures, or false money
"and other similar offences of which one element is falsifying for which a person
ought to be accused and, when convicted, condemned"). This anonymous work, be-
lieved to have been written by Glanville, is regarded as the earliest systematic treatise
of English law. For further discussion of Glanville's treatment of crimen falsi, see 1
STEPHEN, supra note 31, at 177-78.
68 2 HENRY DE BRACTON, ON THE LAws AND CUSTOMS OF ENGLAND 337 (Samuel E.
Thorne trans. & ed., 1968) (limiting crimenfalsi offenses to forgery, counterfeiting,
and clipping of currency).
69Grierson, supra note 28, at 241 ("The view that counterfeiting was no more than
a species of fraud was deeply embedded in Roman jurisprudence.").
70 As Blackstone explains, counterfeiting was regarded as "a breach of allegiance,
[an infringement] of the king's prerogative, [an assumption of] one of the attributes
of the sovereign." See 4 WnLLAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF ENGLAND
*83, 89 (William Draper Lewis ed. 1902). It should be noted, however, that Black-
stone attacked this form of reasoning, arguing that "counterfeiting or debasing the
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Given this non-deception-based view of crimenfalsi, it is not then
surprising that "convictions for many offenses, clearly belonging
to the crimenfa.si of the civilians" were not viewed as such by the
common law.7' Excluded, for example, were "private cheats,
such as the obtaining of goods by false pretences, or the utter-
ing of... forged securities.0
2
Eventually, a shift to a broader, Roman-like, deception-
based theory of crimenfalsi would occur, but not before an ear-
lier shift from substantive criminal law classification to eviden-
tiary category, in the late 1600s.73 It was at this point that crimen
falsi came to be regarded as one of three categories of "infa-
mous" crimes (the others being treason and felony) that ren-
dered a witness incompetent to testify.'4
This shift to evidentiary category, in turn, brought with it
another shift in theory. Initially, disqualification of witnesses
had been viewed as a form of punishment. A person convicted
of a crime "lost his law" (i.e., his right to appear in court).v The
problem with such punishment-based disqualification, however,
was that it tended to penalize innocent defendants who needed
coin [are] usually practiced, rather for the sake of private and unlawful lucre, than
out of any disaffection to the sovereign." Id. at 89.
71 See 1 SIMON GREENLEAF, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF EVIDENCE § 372, at 516 (15th
ed. 1892).
72 Ex parte Wilson, 114 U.S. 417, 423 (1885) (explaining what constituted an infa-
mous crime at common law).
73 A similar shift occurred in the realm of perjury, which, until the fifteenth cen-
tury, was viewed as having more to do with disobedience to the state (and violating an
oath) than with telling a lie. See Michael D. Gordon, The Invention of a Common Law
Crime: Perjuty and the Elizabethan Courts, 24 AMJ. LEG. HIST. 145 (1980). Some modern
authorities continue to view perjury in this manner. See, e.g., United States v. Manfre-
donia, 414 F.2d 760, 764 (2d Cir. 1969) ("It is for the wrong done to the courts and
the administration ofjustice that punishment is given" in cases of perjury); Bennet L.
Gershman, The "Peijury Trap", 129 U. PA. L. REV. 624, 636 (1981). Cf James Q.
Whitman, The Moral Menace of Roman Law and the Making of Commerce: Some Dutch Evi-
dence, 105 YALE LJ. 1841, 1866-69 (1996) (describing links between Roman law and
the rise of "commercial morality" in 17th century Holland, especially in the context
of legal rules regarding counterfeiting and false weights and measures).
74 1 FRANCIS WHARTON, A COMMENTARY ON THE LAW OF EVIDENCE §397, at 354
(1877). Because the latter two categories were punishable by death, it was "very natu-
ral that crimes, deemed of so grave a character as to render the offender unworthy to
live, should be considered as rendering him unworthy of belief in a court ofjustice."
Id. at § 373, at 515.
75 9 HOLDSWORTH, supra note 64, at 191.
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to rely on the testimony of convicted witnesses. If conviction for
crimen falsi was to continue as a basis for disqualification, it
would need some new theory to support it. The theory that de-
veloped was based, in Wigmore's words, on "actual moral turpi-
tude, i.e., the person is to be excluded because from such a
moral nature it is useless to expect the truth."76 This theory was
also consistent with the "social stratification of England, where
class degradation was of itself a serious source of untrustworthi-
ness, and where a judicial accusation of crime was in fact a per-
quisite chiefly of the lower classes." 77  Under this theory, a
person convicted of crimen falsi became, as Greenleaf put it,
"morally too corrupt to be trusted to testify; so reckless of the
distinction between truth and falsehood and insensible to the
restraining forces of an oath, as to render it extremely improb-
able that he will speak the truth at all.
78
The idea that witnesses convicted of criminafalsi were not to
be believed also seems to have reflected the emergence of de-
ceit as a significant moral element in English substantive crimi-
nal law. Nowhere is this phenomenon clearer than in the
developing law of theft.79 Although larceny (theft by stealth)
had been a crime as early as the thirteenth century, theft by de-
ceit, in its various forms, was not criminalized until much later:
common law cheat (typically, the use of false weights and meas-
ures) did not become a crime until at least 1 5 4 1 ;8' forgery in
76 2 JOHN HENRYWIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALs AT COMMON LAw 725-26 (James H.
Chadboum rev. 1979).
Id.
78 See 1 GREENLEAF, supra note 71, at 516.
79 The common law history of theft law is considered in, among other sources,
Bell v. United States, 462 U.S. 356, 358 (1983); to MODEL PENAL CODE § 223.1, com-
ment at 128; GEORGE FLETCHER, RETHINKING CRIMINAL LAw 90-122 (1978); JEROME
HALL, THEFT, LAW AND SOCIETY (2d ed. 1952); PERKINS & BOYCE, supra note 11, at 289-
91; LAFAVE & ScoTT, supra note 11, at 702-03 & n.2; Kathleen F. Brickey, TheJurisprm-
dence of Larceny: An Historical Inquiry and Interest Analysis, 33 VAND. L. REV. 1101
(1980); George P. Fletcher, Manifest Criminality, Criminal Intent, and the Metamorphosis
of Lloyd Weinreb, 90 YAE L.J. 319 (1980); Lloyd L. Weinreb, Manifest Criminality, Crimi-
nal Intent, and the Metamorphosis of Larceny, 90 YALE LJ. 294 (1980).
80 33 Hen. VIII, c.1 (1541). On the origins of the law of common law cheat, see
HALL, supra note 79, at 40; 2 JOEL PRTimss BISHOP, COMMENTARIES ON THE CRIMINAL
LAw ch. 10, 77-94 (5th ed. 1872).
1106 [Vol. 90
2000] DECEIT AND THE CLASSIFICATION OF CRIMES
1562;81 false pretenses in 1757 (and then only as a misde-
meanor)82 ; and larceny by trick in 1779.5 In the earlier period,
the law of theft had been limited by the doctrine of caveat emp-
tor. As Perkins and Boyce put it, "a person who deprived an-
other of his property by force or by stealth was regarded by all as
a very evil person, but he who got the better of another in a
bargain by means of falsehood was more likely to be regarded
by his neighbors as clever than as criminal.""
By the latter part of the eighteenth century, then, the first
transformation in the law of crimenfalsi was complete. Driven by
broader forces that changed the law of evidence and extended
the reach of the criminal law, the list of disqualifying crimenfalsi
offenses in England had become nearly as extensive as the sub-
stantive criminal law classification of crimen falsi under
Hadrian.s What remained to occur was the second transforma-
tion in the concept of crimen falsi-from a category that would
cause a witness to be disqualified, to one that would lead merely
to his impeachment. To understand how and why this change
occurred, we need to look to the influence ofJeremy Bentham.
B. BENTHAM AND CPJMENFALSI
Writing in the latter part of the eighteenth and beginning
of the nineteenth centuries, Bentham set out to cure what he
perceived as a sickness in the English common law. As James
Steintrager has described:
Under the common law men often committed crimes because they
did not even know that the activity which they pursued was criminal.
Even when they did know, they might still pursue the course of action ei-
81 On the origins of the English law of forgery, seeJ.W. Cecil Turner, Documents in
the Law of Forgery, 32 VA. L. REV. 939 (1946). Initially, forgery was defined very nar-
rowly, being limited to the falsification of royal seals and official documents.
82 30 Geo. II, c.24, § 1 (1757). On the origins of false pretenses law, see Arthur R.
Pearce, Theft by False Promises, 101 U. PA. L. REV. 967 (1953).
85 The Kingv. Pear, 2 East P.C. 685 (1779).
84 PERINS & BoYcE, supra note 11, at 289. Moreover, unlike larceny, theft by de-
ception was regarded as consensual; hence, the potential for violence was considered
minimal. Id.
85See 2 WIGMORE, supra note 76, at 730. For example, included among the crimes
that would disqualify a witness from testifying were offenses such as false weights and
measures and conspiracy to defraud by spreading false news. Id.
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ther because the penal sanctions leveled against the crime were insuffi-
cient to deter them, or because the application of those sanctions was
erratic and uncertain. Heinous crimes went unpunished or were often
only lightly punished. Indifferent acts were punished, often with sever-
ity. Acts rightly classified as offences were punished without due regard
to the nature of the crime or the circumstances in which the crime was
committed. Once a case came to trial there were many obstacles to ob-
taining a speedy and fair conclusion. The rules of evidence were highly
technical and unnecessarily complicated. Useful evidence was pre-
cluded on obscure or even absurd grounds. 86
The Rationale of Judicial Evidence, published in 1827, just five
years before his death, contains Bentham's most significant at-
tempt to reform the law of evidence. Bentham sought to craft
rules of evidence that, for the first time in English legal history,
would reflect a rational system of philosophy and logic-rules
similar to those that had been developed on the Continent.8
His work on evidence reflects three basic principles. First,
that the introduction of inferior or otherwise defective evidence
is better than the exclusion of such evidence. Second, that the
evaluation of the weight and credibility of evidence is best left to
the discretion of the ultimate decision-maker, who should pro-
ceed rationally but largely unconfined by formal rules. Third,
that the pursuit of truth is more important than most every
other value in adjudication. 9 Bentham's approach, as summa-
rized by William Twining, was to "[h]ear everyone, admit every-
thing unless the evidence is (a) irrelevant or (b) superfluous or
(c) its production would involve preponderant vexation, ex-
pense or delay."90
Of particular concern to Bentham were the burdensome
and mostly irrational rules regarding the disqualification of wit-
nesses. Testimony "of the accused, of parties to litigation, of
86 JAMES STREINTRAGER, BENTHAM 20-21 (1977).
87 JREMY BENTHAM, RATIONALE OF JUDICIAL. EVIDENCE (1827) [hereinafter
RATIONALE].
88 G.W. KEETON and O.R. MARSHALL, Bentham's Influence on the Law of Evidence, in
GEORGE W. KEETON & GEORG SCHWARZENBERGER, JEREMY BENTHAm AND THE LAw 79, 83
(1948).
89 WILLIAM TwImNG, ThEORiES OF EVIDENCE: BENTHAM AND WIGMORE 42, 108
(1985). See also GERALDJ. POSEMA, BErnHAM AND THE COMMON LAw TRADITION 406
(1986).
90 TwIN NG, supra note 89, at 28.
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spouses and of almost anyone with any interest in the matter was
excluded; Quakers and others who, for reasons of conscience,
refused to take the oath in its prescribed form were also unable
to testify.' ' Even more problematic, in Bentham's view, was the
total exclusion of witnesses who had been convicted of a
crime-a rule that, as noted above, had been in effect at least
since the end of the seventeenth century.
9 2
The Rationale of Judicial Evidence subjects this practice to
withering criticism. Indeed, Bentham says, there is even less
reason to disqualify a person with a prior conviction from testi-
fying than there is for disqualifying a person with an interest in
the litigation.93 Bentham offers perjury (presumably the crime
most directly probative of a witness' veracity) as a type of aforti-
ori example:
When the door of the witness-box is shut against a proposed witness on
this score, it is generally on the ground of some single transgression ....
But a single transgression of this sort, what does it prove? The violated
ceremony apart ... the conviction proves no more than this, viz. that on
one assignable occasion the convict has been known to fall into that sort
of transgression, which every human adult must also have fallen into,
more times than one ....
From a man's having borne false witness in some one instance... it
is inferred, and with the most peremptory assurance, that he will never
bear true witness in the whole course of his life! [To pronounce a man
guilty of an intention to commit perjury merely because he has on a
prior occasion been convicted of perjury would be the summit of injus-
tice.]9 4
In short, Bentham says, the mere fact that a witness has a
prior conviction, even for perjury, says little, if anything, about
the likelihood that he will lie in future judicial proceedings.
Given this reasoning, it might seem doubtful that a prior
conviction for perjury or some other offense involving deceit
91 Id. at 22.
9 2 WiGMon, supra note 76, at 726.
93 5 BENTHAM, RATIONALE, supra note 87, at 81-83.
94 Id. at 81-83. See alsoJEREMYBENTHAM, PRINCIPLES OF PENAL LAw 486 (absent any
interest in the litigation, "the most abandoned criminal that ever was upon the earth"
might be trusted to testify "as safely as the man of the most consummate virtue");
CHRISTOPHER ALLEN, THE LAW OF EVIDENCE IN VICrORIAN ENGLAND 100 (1997) (de-
scribing Bentham's views on disqualification of witnesses convicted of a crime).
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should be. admissible even to impeach. "So broad, so promi-
nent is the stigma, so conspicuous and impressive is the warning
which it gives," says Bentham, "the danger is not that the man
thus distinguished should gain too much credence, but that he
should not gain enough."95 In the end, though, Bentham is too
much the pragmatist to pursue his reasoning to what seems its
logical conclusion. He makes clear that, though he objects to
the disqualification of witnesses on account of a prior conviction,
he has no objection to using a prior conviction for purposes of
impeachment.9" Ultimately, Bentham says, moral turpitude
should be regarded as an objection not to the competence of the
witness, but rather to the weight of his evidence.97
Bentham's views on these points proved enormously influ-
ential. Says Wigmore: "His lucid exposition of [the shortcom-
ings in the common law theory of moral turpitude] and his
determined attack upon its fallacies proved irresistible. The al-
most complete disappearance of this disqualification from An-
glo-American law in the last century has been due to those
arguments. 9 8 By the mid-nineteenth century, the practice of us-
ing prior convictions as a basis for disqualifying witnesses had
been transformed completely into a practice of using convic-
tions as a basis merely for impeaching their credibility.
Bentham's views regarding crimes of deceit in the law of
evidence are thus well known and widely acknowledged. Less
recognized, however, are his views regarding the place of deceit
in the substantive classification of offenses. This is somewhat
surprising. Bentham, who has a claim to being the greatest of
all criminal law codifiers,0 0 devoted nearly a third of his most
famous work on moral and legal theory to the subject of classifi-
95 5 BENTHAM, RATIONALE, supra note 87, at 84.
96 Id. at 84.
97 Id.
98 2 WIGMORE, supra note 76, § 519, at 727. Regarding Bentham's influence on evi-
dence law more generally, see ATILN, supra note 94, at 4-13.
MCCORMICKON EvIDENCE §43, at 93 (3d ed. 1984) (Edward W. Cleary, ed.).
100 See Sanford H. Kadish, The Model Penal Code's Historical Antecedents, 19 RUTGERS
LJ. 521, 522-23 (1988) ("Bentham's thinking on codification of criminal law had a
powerful influence on every codification effort in the English-speaking world in the
nineteenth and twentieth centuries, not excluding the Model Penal Code.").
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cation.' O' Indeed, Bentham can justly be regarded as the Lin-
naeus of the criminal law.
102
Bentham himself did not use the term crimen falsi, and it is
now virtually impossible to know the extent, if any, to which he
was familiar with the history of that concept.03 Nevertheless, it
is obvious that he was concerned with the role of deceit in the
classification of crime. As William Twining has explained, de-
spite his pragmatism, Bentham's hatred for falsehood and de-
ception was virtually an obsession: "Some of his most virulent
prose is directed at hypocrisy, fraud, swindling, quackery, and
all forms of falsehood; his polemical vocabulary centres to an
extraordinary degree around the themes of mendacity, decep-
tion and pretence.' 0 4
Chapter XVI of Bentham's An Introduction to the Principles of
Morals and Legislation contains his theory of the "Division of Of-
fences."'0 5  Like virtually every other criminal law codifier, he
101 See JEREMY BENTHAM, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS AND
LEGISLATION 187-280 (J.H. Burns and H.L.A. Hart, eds., Athlone Press 1970) (1780)
[hereinafter BENTHAM, PRINCIPLES]. See also H.LA. HART, ESSAYS ON BENTHAM:
JURISPRUDENCE AND POLFIcAL THEORY 3 (1982) (noting Bentham's interest in "identi-
fying and classifying hundreds of individual offences according to the human inter-
ests which they adversely affected. Bentham put this forward as a universal 'natural'
arrangement of those forms of conduct which a code constructed on utilitarian prin-
ciples would require to be treated as offences, and it was designed to serve both as a
critique of existing legal systems and as the basis for the construction of new rational
codes of law.").
Bentham later presented a more general theory of classification in his Essay on
Nomenclature and Classification, in JEREMY BENTHAM, CHRESTOMATHIA, in 8 THE WORKS
OFJEREmYBENTHAM, Appendix, No. 4 at 63-128 (orig. publ. 1816, John Bowring, ed.
1962). The history of criminal law codification during this period is dealt with in
IJ.M. SMITH, LAwYERS, LEGISLATORS AND THEORISTS: DEVELOPMENTS IN ENGLISH
CRIMINAL JURISPRUDENCE 1800-1957, 66-84 (1998). The degree to which Bentham
emphasized the importance of classification as a step in the reform of criminal law
seems to have been unique.
102 Thanks to Peter Alldridge and Keith Smith for this characterization.
103 Bentham's extraordinarily wide reading undoubtedly included works of Roman
and civil law, though I have been unable to find any evidence that Bentham was spe-
cifically familiar with the Roman and civil law conception of crimen falsi. On Ben-
tham's early education, see CHARLES WARREN EvERETT, THE EDUCATION OF JEREMY
BENTHAM (1931); MARY P. MACK, JEREMY BENTHAM: AN ODYSSEY OF IDEAS 1748-1792
(1963).
104 TWINING, supra note 89, at 90.
105 Gerald Postema has described the background against which Bentham was
working:
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developed a classificatory scheme based primarily on harmful-
ness. Bentham's highest level classification distinguishes among
Offences Against Individuals, Semi-Public Offences, Self-
Regarding Offences, and Public Offences. Yet Bentham's
scheme of classification did not end there. Apparently recog-
nizing the traditional role of deceit as a classificatory category,
Bentham added a fifth category of offenses, which he called
Multiform or Heterogeneous Offences. This category has as
one of its subdivisions "Offences by Falsehood," or "Offences
Concerning Trust," which consists, in turn, of four subcatego-
ries-Simple Falsehoods, Forgery, 
Personation, and Perjury. 
Bentham's attitude toward the "Offences by Falsehood" is
an ambivalent one. On the one hand, he acknowledges the sig-
nificance of deceit in the classification of crime: "Offences by
Falsehood," he says, "however diversified in other particulars,
have this in common, that they consist in some abuse of the fac-
ulty of discourse.... Falsehoods, of whatever kind they be,
agree in this: that they give men to understand that things are
otherwise than as in reality they are."0 7 On the other hand,
Bentham expresses some obvious anxiety about the perpetua-
tion of such categories:
Instead of considering [offences by falsehood and offences against
trust] as so many divisions of offences, divided into genera... they may be
considered as so many specific differences, respectively applicable to
those genera. Thus, in the case of a simple personal injury, in the operation
of which a plan of falsehood has been employed: it seems more simple
and more natural, to consider the offence thus committed as a particular
species of modification of the genus of offence termed a simple personal in-
jury, than to consider the simple personal injury, when effected by such
[By the middle of the 18th century], the criminal law was a hodge-podge of confusion and
inconsistency. English law published a "dreadful catalogue" of capital crimes, including
"transgressions which scarcely deserve corporal punishment" while it omitted "enormities
of the most atrocious kind." The presumption of knowledge of the criminal law embodied
in the maxim "ignorance of the law is no excuse" was a cruel joke for all but a very few who
could afford legal advice.
GERALD POsTEMA, BENTHAM AND THE COMMON LAW TRADITION 264 (1986) (citations
omitted).
106BENTHAM, PRINCIPLES, supra note 101, at 190-91, 203.
107 Id. at 203.
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means, as a modification of the division of offences entitled Offences
through falsehood.'08
What Bentham seems to be saying is that a preferable classi-
fication system would identif y offenses committed through
falsehood as a subcategory of crimes involving injury to the per-
son (e.g., false pretenses as a subset of theft), rather than injury
to the person as a subcategory of offenses committed through
falsehood (e.g., false pretenses as a subset of crimenfalsi). As a
more general matter, Bentham seems to be acknowledging the
traditional significance of deceit as a factor in classification, but
yielding ultimately to the demands of harmfulness as the pre-
vailing classificatory principle.
IV. THE MODERN LAW OF CRAMENFALSI
C. FEDERAL RULE OF EVIDENCE 609(A) (2)
By the time Congress enacted the Federal Rules of Evidence
in 1975, Bentham's view-that a conviction for crimen falsi was
proper for impeaching rather than disqualifying witnesses-had
long since passed into common practice. The question for
Congress was how exactly to formulate the traditional rule of
impeachment within the broader framework of the Federal
Rules. (The Law Commission for England and Wales, it should
be noted, has been dealing with an almost identical problem.)'09
Federal Rule of Evidence 609 was designed to resolve the
basic conflict posed by the practice of allowing witnesses to be
impeached with prior convictions. As Weinstein and Berger
have put it:
Permitting unlimited use of defendant's criminal past for impeach-
ment undoubtedly results in more convictions; it also increases the like-
lihood that a person will be found guilty merely of being "bad" rather
than of having committed the charged crime. Limiting the use of con-
victions for impeachment provides greater protection for the innocent,
108 Id. at 191 n.g.
109 The Commission's preliminary report, Law Commission Consultation Paper
No. 141 (1996), can be found at:
<http://www.open.gov.uk/lawcomm/library/lib-crim.htm#libcpl4l>.
1113
1114 STUART P. GREEN [Vol. 90
but may deny a jury information that would be helpful in evaluating the
credibility of witnesses."0
Interestingly, though, while there was extensive debate in
Congress over the precise shape of Rule 609,"' there appears to
have been virtually no discussion of the underlying premise that
a person who has been convicted of either a crime of deceit or
some other serious crime is unworthy of belief."
2
Rule 609 reflects a crucial distinction between impeach-
ment for crimen falsi and impeachment for other kinds of of-
fenses. Under subsection (a) (1), evidence that a witness has
been convicted of a crime that does not involve dishonesty or
false statement is admissible only if the court determines that its
probative value is not outweighed by its prejudicial effect."3
110 3JAcKB. WEINSTEIN & MARGARET A. BERGER, WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE 1 609[01],
at 609-25 (1992).
i"The extent of the floor debate in the House over Rule 609(a) far exceeded
that relating to any other provision of the Evidence Rules." 28 CHARLEs ALAN WRIGHT
& VICTORJAMES GOLD, FEDERAL PRACrICE AND PROCEDURE, § 6131, at 154 (1993). The
rule went through numerous revisions before reaching its final form. The legislative
history of the rule is discussed in Green v. Bock Laundry Mach. Co, 490 U.S. 504 (1989).
On the history and theory of the rules surrounding the use of character evidence
generally, see David P. Leonard, In Defense of the Character Evidence Prohibition: Founda-
tions of the Rule Against Trial by Character, 73 IND. L.J. 1161 (1998).
112 Richard Uviller has questioned the extent to which the commission of such a
crime really is probative of a witness' propensity for falsehood on the stand. H. Rich-
ard Uviller, Credence, Character, and the Rules of Evidence: Seeing Through the Liar's Tale,
42 DUKE L.J. 776, 791-92 (1993). While I agree with him that this is a legitimate and
important question, it nevertheless lies somewhere outside the scope of the inquiry
here.
113 As originally enacted, Rule 609 provided that prosecution witnesses and wit-
nesses in civil cases could be impeached with all felony convictions and any convic-
tions involving crimen falsi regardless of possible prejudice to the witness. What was
unclear in the original text was whether a felony conviction offered to impeach a wit-
ness in a civil case could be inadmissible because of resultant prejudice to a party, and
the lower courts were divided on this issue. In Green v. Bock Laundy Machine Co., 490
U.S. 504 (1989), the Court resolved the Circuit split, holding that a trial judge is re-
quired to admit prior felony convictions to impeach a witness in a civil case, and that
only a criminal defendant is protected by the balancing provisions of the rule. Con-
gress subsequently amended Rule 609, rejecting the holding in Green. Under the
amendment, when the witness is "other than the accused," prior felony convictions
must be subjected to the balancing provisions of Rule 403 (which provides that "evi-
dence may excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of
unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations
of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence").
When the witness is the accused, however, the Rule implicitly requires a determina-
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Under subsection (a) (2), however, evidence that a witness has
been convicted of such a crime will be admissible regardless of
its prejudicial effect. The Rule states that "evidence that any
witness has been convicted of a crime shall be admitted [for the
purpose of attacking the witness' credibility] if it involved dis-
honesty or false statement, regardless of punishment." Such
convictions are considered so probative of a witness' propensity
to lie that, unlike convictions for non-crimina falsi, they can be
introduced without any balancing of probative value against
prejudice. If the crime falls under this provision, the conviction
must be admitted; the judge has no discretion to exclude.1
Moreover, under this provision, as at common law, the potential
punishment for the crime is of no consequence; misdemeanors
involving dishonesty or false statement, as well as felonies, are
admissible.
Two basic problems with the language of Rule 609(a) (2)
can be identified. The first lies in the use of the term "dishon-
esty or false statement." An obvious question is whether this
term is meant to be coextensive with the traditional notion of
crimen falsi, or whether it creates a new category of crimes dis-
tinct from the common law background. A second problem lies
in the uncertain boundaries of the category of crimenfalsi itself.
Assuming that crimes of "dishonesty or false statement" are co-
extensive with the crimina falsi, we want to know which convic-
tions will be covered. As the above history demonstrates, what
has counted as a crime of deceit in one era has not necessarily
qualified as a crime of deceit in another.
While it may seem obvious that crimes of violence such as
murder, arson, and rape do not involve "dishonesty or false
statement," a harder issue is raised by crimes of acquisition,
such as larceny, extortion, shoplifting, tax evasion, and burglary,
Moreover, it is unclear whether the Rule applies only when the
definition of the crime committed requires dishonesty or false
statement, or whether it would also apply in a particular in-
stance in which a crime has, but need not have, been committed
tion that the "probative value" of the conviction "outweighs its prejudicial effect to
the accused." It is important to note, however, that neither Bock Laundry nor the
1990 amendments to Rule 609 have had any effect on the meaning of the critical
term, "crime involv[ing] dishonesty or false statement." See generally 3 WEINSTEIN &
BERGER, supra note 110, 1 609 [08), at 609-71.
114 See, e.g., United States v. Wong, 703 F.2d 65, 67 (3d Cir.) (explaining the dif-
ference between Rule 609(a) (1) and (a) (2)), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 842 (1983).
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through dishonesty or false statement (for example, when an
accused has committed murder or rape by luring the victim into
a back alley through a lie or trick or some other dishonest
means).
1. What Does (or Should) Rule 609(a)(2) Mean by "Dishonesty or False
Statement"?
Although Rule 609 (a) (2) was intended to clarify the scope
of the common law rule of impeachment, the use of the phrase
"dishonesty or false statement" has had the opposite effect. Nei-
ther term is defined in the rules of evidence, and their meaning
can hardly be described as transparent. The term "crimes in-
volving false statement" presumably refers to crimes such as per-
jury, making false statements, numerous kindred false
statements offenses, and perhaps subornation of perjury.115 The
difficult task is in determining which additional crimes, if any,
should count as "crimes involving dishonesty."
We can identify four basic approaches adopted by the
courts and commentators in interpreting the word "dishonesty"
as it appears in Rule 609 (a) (2). Under the first approach, virtu-
ally any crime would qualify as a crime of "dishonesty." Such a
view is based on the premise that "all crimes imply disregard for
social obligations, hence a willingness or propensity to lie."
' 16
Obviously, the group of crimes so identified would be far larger
than those contained in the traditional category of crimenfalsi.
This was the position taken by Representative Danielson
during the debate on the floor of the House. According to
Danielson:
[T]here is no point in using both terms in section 609(a) unless they
mean two different things, or at least that the term "dishonesty" is much
broader than "false statement."
Who can state that murder does not involve dishonesty? Who can,
for instance, say stealing does not involve dishonesty? If stealing does
not involve dishonesty, then what does it involve?
115 Of course, while one need not actually make a false statement to commit sub-
ornation of perjury, the purpose of such conduct is to further the making of a false
statement.
116 CHRISTOPHER B. MUELLER & LAIRD C. KIRKPATRIMK, MODERN EVIDENCE:
DocRnNE AND PRAcTIcE § 6.44, at 837 (1995).
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The terms "dishonest" and "false statement" are not synonymous as
used in this code section .... [I] t was and is my intention that the term
"dishonesty" is broader than "false statement," and any offense involving
moral turpitude such as stealing, robbery, burglary, or what have you, in
my opinion is an offense involving dishonesty.
Although few courts have gone quite as far as Danielson
suggests, some have construed Rule 609(a) (2) very broadly, to
apply to crimes that have nothing whatsoever to do with deceit,
such as heroin possession,"" armed robbery,'19 assault,120 prosti-
tution, 12 and drunk driving.1
2
The obvious problem with this view is that it tends to obviate
almost any distinction between Section (a) (1) and (a) (2). By
qualifying virtually any crime as a crime "involving dishonesty or
false statement," prosecutors would almost always be able to
avoid the subsection (a) (1) requirement that probative value
not be outweighed by prejudicial effect. They would invariably
117 120 Cong. Rec. 2377-81, quoted in 28 WRIGHT & GOLD, supra note 111, § 6131,
at 159. Against this view, Congressman Wiggins stated: "The thrust of 'dishonesty' as
used in this bill goes to his veracity and his ability to relate the truth. 'Dishonesty' is
tested, for example, by perjury convictions and convictions dealing with false state-
ments, but not general criminality. Evidence for a conviction of murder goes to
criminality, not to dishonesty." Id. at 158-59.
Rule 8.4 of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct presents an analogous inter-
pretive problem. The rule says that it is "professional misconduct for a lawyer to," in-
ter alia, "commit a criminal act that reflects adversely on the lawyer's honesty,
trustworthiness or fitness as a lawyer in other respects," or "engage in conduct involv-
ing dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation." The Commentary to Rule 8.4
states:
It could be argued that the commission of any crime reflects on a lawyer's honesty or his
fitness, because honest people do not commit crimes. But this argument does not recog-
nize, as the criminal law does, that even among serious crimes the degree of immorality in-
volved may differ and so may implications about the offender's character.
2 GEOFFREY C. HAZARD & W. WILIAM HODES, THE LAw OF LAWYERING: A HANDBOOK ON
THE MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT § 8.4:301, at 955 (2d ed.) (1992 supp.).
118 United States v. Barnes, 622 F.2d 107 (5th Cir. 1980).
119 United States v. Krinslow, 860 F.2d 963, 968 (9th Cir. 1988).
120 United States v. Harvey, 588 F.2d 1201 (8th Cir. 1978); United States v.Jackson,
405 F. Supp. 938 (E.D.N.Y. 1975).
121 United States v. Cox, 536 F.2d 65, 71 (5th Cir. 1976); United States v. Walker,
613 F.2d 1349 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 944 (1980).
122 United States v. Lossiah, 537 F.2d 1250 (4th Cir. 1976).
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seek to rely on the more permissive language of Subsection
(a) (2).
A second approach lies at the other extreme. It would es-
sentially read the word "dishonesty" out of the Rule. This is the
view suggested by a number of scholars, who have argued that
the term "dishonesty" has "little meaning,"123 that it is "superflu-
ous,"'2 4 and that it is "virtually swallowed by its partner, 'false
statement.'"2
Understood literally, this reading of the rule is incorrect as
well, since there are a number of traditional cimenfalsi offenses
that do not require a false statement. Fraud and forgery are the
most obvious examples. 26 Although neither crime requires the
making of a false statement, both were certainly regarded as cri-
minafalsi at common law, and both are at least as probative of a
witness' credibility as offenses that do involve false statements,
such as perjury and false declarations. 7
A third possibility is to read the word "dishonesty" broadly
enough to include crimes involving wrongful pecuniary gain-
such as larceny, bribery, smuggling, and tax evasion-but not so
broadly as to refer to crimes of pure violence, like murder and
rape. Such an interpretation would obviously exceed the tradi-
tional common law scope of aimen falsi. This was the view fa-
vored by Mason Ladd (writing well before the adoption of the
Federal Rules):
123 McCoRMICK, supra note 99, § 43, at 95 n.10 ("little meaning attaches to 'dis-
honesty,' save perhaps for embezzlement, and conflict among courts attempting to
reconcile plain meaning with legislative history has resulted").
124 John Schmertz, The First Decade Under Article V of the Federal Rules of Evidence:
Some Suggested Amendments to Fill Gaps and Cure Confusion, 30 ViiL. L. REV. 1367, 1447-
48 (1985).
125 28 WRiGHT AND GoLD, supra note 111, at 247.
126See, e.g., Lustiger v. United States, 386 F.2d 132 (9th Cir. 1967) (in mail fraud
case under 18 U.S.C. § 1341, "[T]he fact that there is no misrepresentation of a single
existing fact is immaterial. It is only necessary to prove that it is a scheme reasonably
calculated to deceive .... ), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 951 (1968).
127 In fairness to the authors criticized, it should be noted that all of them seem to
favor a construction of Rule 609(a) (2) which would in fact include deception crimes
that do not involve false statements. My criticism is based solely on their failure to
recognize the difference between crimes of dishonesty and crimes of false statement,
and on the logical consequences of this error.
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The classification of crimenfalsi is too narrow... to meet the credibility
test. ... [R]obbery, larceny, and burglary, while not showing a propen-
sity to falsify, do disclose a disregard for the rights of others which might
reasonably be expected to express itself in giving false testimony when-
ever it would be to the advantage of the witness.
The problem with this view, however, is that it blurs the
moral distinction between stealing and lying. A person who
steals is certainly dishonest; she rejects the idea of making an
honest living; she cheats; she takes something to which she is
not entitled; she disobeys the rules. But there is no particular
reason to think that she is deceitful. Indeed, what little empiri-
cal evidence there is indicates that a prior conviction for larceny
(stealing by stealth) says little or nothing about a witness' pro-
pensity to lie.'29
The final, and, in my view, best, reading of Rule 609(a) (2) is
that the phrase "dishonesty or false statement" should be under-
stood as a stand-in for the traditional common law notion of
crimen falsi. This construction would allow room for offenses
like perjury and false statements (which do involve false state-
ments) as well offenses like false pretenses, medicare fraud, mail
fraud, securities fraud, welfare fraud, making false claims, know-
ingly passing bad checks, tampering with measuring devices,
and forgery (all of which involve some form of deception, but
do not necessarily involve false statements). At the same time, it
would exclude pecuniary offenses not traditionally viewed as
criminafalsi, such as larceny, robbery, receiving stolen property,
blackmail, extortion, and bribery. Also excluded would be
crimes that require neither dishonesty nor deception, such as
rape, murder, assault, battery, public drunkenness, driving while
intoxicated, and prostitution and other sex offenses.
Under this construction, then, one would read the phrase
"crimes involving dishonesty or false statement" as equivalent to
the phrase "crimes involving deceit or false statement," or, more
simply, "crimes involving deceit" (since every crime that involves
128 Mason Ladd, Credibility Tests-Current Trends, 89 U. PA. L. REV. 166, 180 (1940).
129See A.N. Doob & H.M. Kirshenbaum, Some Empirical Evidence On the Effect of s.12
of the Canada Evidence Act Upon an Accused, 15 CRIM. L.Q. 88, 89 (1972-73) ("The data
indicate that a person who would be likely to steal something in one situation would
not be more likely to tell lies in a second situation than would someone who would
not steal in the first instance. In other words, the data indicate that these kinds of
behaviors are very specific to situations.").
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an intentional false statement also involves deceit). In other
words, one would allow impeachment under Rule 609 (a) (2)
only when the prior conviction involved a crime that would fit
into the traditional category of crimenfalsi."'5
2. Should Courts Be Permitted (or Required) to Inquire Into Facts
Underlying a Conviction in Order to Determine if a Crime Was
Committed by Means of Dishonesty or False Statement?
There remains the question whether, even when the crime
for which defendant was convicted does not require a showing
of falsity or deceit, a court may look to the manner in which the
crime was committed in order to determine whether a prior
conviction involves deceit, and therefore falls within the scope
of Rule 609 (a) (2). According to Mueller and Kirkpatrick,
"[o]verwhelmingly... the practice is to allow and even encour-
age inquiry into underlying facts."' 3' This is also the position
endorsed by Richard Uviller, who argues that expanding the
category of "dishonesty or false statement" crimes beyond the
traditional list of crimen falsi offenses "accords with the govern-
ISO Even under this approach, however, there remains the question of how to deal
with offenses, like embezzlement, in which the presence of deceit is ambiguous. The
Conference Committee Report itself has contributed to this confusion by listing em-
bezzlement, along with obvious deceit crimes such as perjury, subornation of perjury,
false statement, criminal fraud, and false pretenses, as examples of offenses that are
covered by Rule 609(a) (2). Following the Conference Report, most courts have held
that embezzlement is covered by the Rule. See, e.g., Gaudin v. Shell Oil Co., 132
F.R.D. 178, 179 (E.D. La. 1990). At the same time, by referring to "embezzlement"
and "false pretenses," rather than "theft," the Report seems to imply that not all theft
offenses are per se crimes of dishonesty-again, an understanding that has been
adopted by most courts. Independent of the Conference Report, however, we need
to ask whether embezzlement really should be included in the list of criminafalsi. In
one sense, embezzlement does seem to involve an element of falsehood or deceit,
since it is hard to imagine a case of embezzlement in which the perpetrator has not in
some sense deceived his victim (at least into believing that the perpetrator is honest
and loyal). But the better view, I think, looking to the formal elements of the offense,
is that embezzlement is not a crime of deceit.
131 3 CHRISTOPER B. MUELLER & LAIRD C. K IATRICKr, FEDERAL EVIDENCE, § 278, at
270 (2d ed. 1994) (listing cases). See also, e.g., United States v. Mejia-Alarcon, 995
F.2d 982, 989-90 (10th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S.Ct. 334 (1994); Altobello v. Bor-
den Confectionary Products, Inc., 872 F.2d 215, 216 (7th Cir. 1989); United States v.
Givens, 767 F.2d 574, 579 n.1 (9th Cir. 1985); United States v. Lipscomb, 702 F.2d
1049 (D.C. Cir. 1983); United States v. Grandmont, 680 F.2d 867, 870-72 (1st Cir.
1982). For a contrary view, see United States v. Lewis, 626 F.2d 940, 946 (D.C. Cir.
1980).
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ing concept of relevance: The behavior of the individual in
committing the crime reveals a trait of character from which the
inference of testimonial mendacity may be reasonably drawn. If
anything, it is the actor's behavior that supports the inference,
not the statutory definition of the crime."
There are, however, compelling reasons to question such a
departure from the common law evidentiary approach to crimen
falsi. The most commonly expressed argument centers on ad-
ministrative concerns. Allowing courts to inquire into the un-
derlying facts of a prior conviction tends to create confusion
and administrative burdens."3
The problem posed by such an inquiry can be understood
as analogous to a problem in Double Jeopardy law. The Double
Jeopardy Clause prohibits multiple prosecutions for the "same
offense." Under the traditional approach to Double Jeopardy
expressed in Blockburger v. United States,"" two offenses are the
same for double jeopardy purposes if one set of elements is ei-
ther identical to or a subset of the other-a rule referred to as
the "same elements" test. Under an alternative approach ex-
pressed in Grady v. Corbin,"4 even if two criminal statutes do not
constitute the "same offense" under Blockburger, the Double
Jeopardy Clause bars subsequent prosecution if the govern-
ment, in order to prove an essential element of an offense
charged, would have to prove conduct that constitutes an offense
for which the defendant had already been prosecuted. Requir-
ing courts to look to the underlying facts of the case is known as
the "same conduct' test. In overruling Grady, the United States
Supreme Court in United States v. Dixon? reasoned that the
132 Uviller, supra note 112, at 809.
133 See, e.g., CHRISTOPHER B. MUE.LER & LAiRD C. KnPATRICK, EVIDENCE § 6.48, at
632 (1995):
There is something to be said for a formalistic approach in which a conviction fits [Rule
609(a) (2)] only if dishonesty or false statement is among the elements of the offense: It
would simplify administration and spare courts and litigants from spending time on collat-
eral inquiries that could be elaborate. Scrutiny of underlying facts seems vaguely inconsis-
tent with the practice of allowing inquiry only on the essentials of convictions (name of
crime, punishment imposed, time and sometimes place) with further details kept off limits.
134 284 U.S. 299 (1932).
135 495 U.S. 508 (1990).
136 509 U.S. 688 (1993).
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"same conduct" test was both at odds with the historical ap-
proach to the "same offense" determination and was too likely
to cause confusion. In determining whether a defendant has al,
ready been prosecuted for the "same offense," it is both less
burdensome and less confusing to look solely at the elements of
the offenses rather than engage in a review of the evidence that
was offered in the earlier proceeding.
An analogous argument applies in the context of Rule
609(a) (2). To allow (or require) courts to look to the facts of a
prior conviction in determining whether the crime involved
dishonesty or false statement is likely to create both administra-
tive burdens and legal uncertainty. As in the Double Jeopardy
context, the "formalistic" approach is the preferable one. (Of
course, in the Double Jeopardy context, the formalistic ap-
proach favors the state; in the context of Rule 609, it can favor
either the state or the accused, depending on which side the
witness is testifying for.)
A second reason for rejecting the fact-based inquiry ap-
proach is that it is at odds with the overall structure of the im-
peachment rules. By allowing (or requiring) courts to inquire
into the underlying facts of the conviction, Rule 609(a) (1) is
likely to be swallowed up by Rule 609(a) (2). Rule 609(a) (2) will
become the rule, rather than the exception, even though the
probative versus prejudicial weighing approach of the former
rule is more representative of the Federal Rules' approach gen-
erally.1
87
A third (and, I believe, the most compelling) reason for re-
jecting the majority approach rests on an understanding of
criminal law and procedure, rather than the law of evidence.
One needs to recognize that criminal offenses are defined by
their elements, not by the facts of their commission. To admit
conviction evidence is to tell the jury nothing more than that
the elements of the crime of which the witness was convicted
were proven beyond a reasonable doubt. Undoubtedly, a large
majority of criminal acts do involve some form of deception. A
rapist or kidnagper may use deception to lure a victim to a re-
mote location. A perpetrator bent on violating the antitrust
137 This point is made in 2 STEPHEN A. SALTZBURG et aL, FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE
MANUAL 893 (6th ed. 1994).
138 See Patricia J. Falk, Rape by Fraud and Rape by Coercion, 64 BROOK. L. REV. 3D
(1998).
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laws may use duplicity in doing so. 9 But, in each case, the fact
that deception was used will never have been found beyond a
reasonable doubt. To allow a court to look to underlying facts
in determining whether to admit a prior conviction as a crime




The criminafalsi, or crimes of deceit, present an intriguing
problem in the history of criminal law classification. Across
time and legal cultures, the primary concept around which
crimes have been classified has been harmfulness. Yet the idea
of crimenfalsi-with a history stretching from the lex Cornelia de
Falsis of the first century B.C.E. to the American Federal Rules
of Evidence-reflects a system of classification that, at times, has
transcended mere harmfulness to embrace a distinct notion of
moral wrongfulness.
The idea of grouping together crimes involving deceit
proved especially useful to the Romans. It allowed them to ex-
pand the jurisdiction of the specialized questio de falsis well be-
yond the original crimes of forgery and counterfeiting to deal
with economic, social, and juridical problems arising out of
conduct constituting the modem offenses of perjury, obstruc-
tion of justice, fraud, false weights and measures, and false
claims. The classification of offenses under the rubric of deceit
was also a common element in subsequent Roman-law influ-
enced criminal codes, as we saw in our discussion of Las Siete
Partidas.
Although the morally wrongful act of deceit continues to
make its presence felt in the classification of crime in a number
of subtle ways, it has mostly disappeared as a basic classificatory
category. Harmfulness, and the classifications it has spawned,
now occupy the field. Even when offenses such as "Theft by De-
ception" have survived, moreover, such labels seem to reflect
the particular kind of harm associated with deceit at least as
much as any distinct notion of moral wrongfulness.
1s9 See Mark R. Patterson, Coercion, Deception, and Other Demand-Increasing Practices in
Antitrust Law, 66 ANTrrRUSTL.J. 1 (1997).
140 A similar argument is made in 28 WRIGHTrAND GOLD, supra note 111, at 253.
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Nevertheless, the concept of crimen falsi remains pregnant
with contemporary significance. Federal Rule of Evidence
609(a) (2) allows for impeachment of witnesses who have been
convicted of crimes involving "dishonesty or false statement."
This language has led to considerable confusion on the part of
courts and commentators. As I have suggested here, much of
this confusion could be dispelled if Rule 609 were interpreted
with an appreciation of the ancient and common law history of
crimenfalsi.
